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Abstract. In this paper, the amount of income redistribution in the United States, the 
European Union, and in Switzerland is compared and empirically related to economic, 
political, and behavioral determinants elaborated in the literature. Lying in between the two 
poles, data on Switzerland provides evidence about the relative merits of competing 
hypotheses. It tips the balance against the economic explanation, which predicts more rather 
than less income redistribution in the United States compared to the EU in general. It only 
weakly supports the political model linking proportional representation and multiparty 
structure (which also characterize Switzerland) to redistribution; yet the Swiss share of 
transfers in the GDP is low. Behavioral explanations receive a good deal of support from the 
case of Switzerland, two countries that share with the United States the belief that hard 
work rather than luck, birth, connections, and corruption determine wealth. In this way, the 
Janus faces of Switzerland may help to explain the difference in the amount of U.S. and EU 
income redistribution. 
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1. Introduction 
he objective of this paper is to compare the amount of income 
redistribution of the United States, the European Union (EU), and 
Switzerland. While a European country, Switzerland is not a member 
of the EU and has some institutional features reminiscent of the United 
States. Like the Roman god Janus it is therefore predicted to "look both 
ways". Indeed, EU social programs will be found to be more extensive, 
generous, and pro-poor and tax systems to be more progressive than those 
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of United States. Invariably, Switzerland stands in between. What are the 
economic, political, and behavioral factors that may be responsible for this? 
Possible economic explanations are the variance and skewness of the 
before-tax income distribution, the social costs of taxation, expected future 
changes in income for median voters and volatility of income over time. 
However, Alesina et al. (2001) argue that these economic determinants 
cannot explain observed differences in redistributive policies between the 
United States and the EU. They find that while the before-tax income in the 
United States has higher variance and more skewness than in the EU, 
redistribution in the United States is less although the deadweight losses 
from taxation seem to be about the same. Switzerland will be shown to lie 
in between. On the other hand, the “Prospect of Upward Mobility” 
(POUM) hypothesis, originally suggested by Hirschman & Rothschild 
(1973) and formulated by Benabou & Ok (2001), is confirmed by Alesina & 
La Ferrara (2005) who empirically show that people with high expected 
future income do not favor redistribution in the United States2. In the EU, 
income mobility is relatively low, with Switzerland again situating in 
between but having a lower level of public expenditure than the EU 
average. Thus, contrary to theoretical predictions, we observe a negative 
correlation between income mobility and public expenditure on the 
aggregate level. As to political explanations, Alesina & Glaeser (2004) cite 
U.S. institutions that prevent minorities from gaining political power which 
could be used for income redistribution. At the federal level, the United 
States applies majority rule for election to the Congress and for president; 
moreover, courts have consistently been rejecting popular attempts at 
redistribution. The constitutions of EU member countries are more oriented 
toward proportional representation and less toward protection of private 
property. Switzerland on the one hand has a degree of proportional 
representation that even exceeds the EU average; on the other hand, its 
courts strongly protect private property (cf. Moser, 1994). Extensive direct 
democratic control might serve to limit public welfare spending while 
enforcing efficiency in redistribution. But then, Switzerland is comparable 
to the EU average when it comes to the amount of transfers and subsidies. 
The behavioral explanations for redistribution (Fong et al., 2006) emphasize 
reciprocal altruism. This hypothesis states that U.S. voters dislike giving 
money to the poor whom they perceive as lazy. Moreover, Gilens (1999) 
and Alesina & Glaeser (2004) argue that troubled race relations are a major 
reason for the absence of an American welfare state. EU citizens, by way of 
contrast, tend to believe that the poor have been unfortunate, and until 
recently, immigration from non-white countries has been too limited to 
make race a relevant category. Between these two poles, Switzerland seems 
 
2 Using a data set from Russia, Ravallion & Lokshin (2000) have shown that even those who 
are currently rich may tend to support redistribution if they expect their welfare to fall. 
This is known as a "tunnel effect". Moln{r & Kapit{ny (2006a); Moln{r & Kapit{ny (2006b) 
find that people who have no clear knowledge about the immediate and the distant future 
favor redistribution more than those with negative expectations. 
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to be similar to the United States in all of the three dimensions cited above, 
giving rise to the correct prediction that it spends relatively little on public 
welfare. It should be noted that all of these explanations abstract from the 
incentives of politicians, acting as entrepreneurs, to redistribute income and 
wealth in order to secure (re)election (cf. Brunner & Meckling, 1977; 
Cukierman & Meltzer, 1986). This ultra-political explanation hinges on the 
fact that the cost of redistribution usually takes on the form of efficiency 
losses that have to be borne by all citizens, whereas its benefits can be 
channeled to those lobbies that provide support or those voters who are 
pivotal at the next election. Of course, the institutional differences cited 
above make it easier for politicians to pursue their objectives in some 
countries and more difficult in others. Yet, politicians have a permanent 
incentive to push back those constraints that limit their freedom of action. 
In all, this hypothesis predicts that redistribution occurs largely regardless 
of preferences in the population. For simplicity, it will not be pursued in 
detail but may serve as an explanation of why the amount of redistribution 
keeps growing over time (for an analysis in the case of social health 
insurance, see Zweifel, 2007). The structure of this paper is as follows. In 
Section 2, the size and structure of redistribution in the United States, 
selected EU countries, and Switzerland are presented. Section 3 tests the 
economic explanations for redistribution, which are contradicted by the 
case of Switzerland. Section 4 again finds that political explanations are not 
confirmed by Swiss experience. Section 5 presents behavioral determinants 
which are not only successful in explaining the differences between the 
United States and the EU but are also confirmed by Switzerland. Section 6 
provides a final assessment of the determinants of public social spending in 
a multivariate model. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Size and structure of redistribution in the United 
States, the EU, and Switzerland 
In this section, the basic facts concerning redistribution in the United 
States, the EU, and Switzerland are presented, starting first with 
government spending and revenue, and then turning to regulation 
designed to achieve income redistribution, such as minimum wage laws. 
 
2.1. Government spending 
Table 1 shows the size and composition of government expenditure. 
Total government expenditure in the EU-15 averages 46 percent of GDP; it 
reaches 53 percent in France and even 56 percent in Sweden but only 37 
percent in the United States. Switzerland is just below the U.S. value with 
36 percent. However, it is the share of transfers (subsidies and social 
benefits) where differences are most marked. 
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Table 1. Composition of general government expenditure in percent of GDP, 2006 
 country total government 
expenditure 
consumption 
(appropriation account) 
subsidies social 
benefits 
fixed 
investment 
  total 
consumption 
goods and 
services 
wages    
     
US 36.6 15.8 6.1 9.7 0.4 12.0 3.3 
EU-15 46.0 20.4 10.2 10.2 1.2 16.3 2.5 
Austria 49.2 18.0 8.7 9.3 3.1 18.3 1.1 
France 53.4 23.6 10.5 13.1 1.5 17.8 3.4 
Germany 45.7 18.3 11.1 7.2 1.2 18.6 1.4 
Sweden 55.5 26.8 11.1 15.7 1.6 16.7 3.1 
UK 45.0 22.0 10.6 11.4 0.4 13.0 1.8 
Switzerland 36.3 10.9 2.8 8.1 4.0 12.0 2.3 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook database (No 82, 
Dec. 2007). Details may not sum to totals because of excluded categories.    
 
In fact, the sum of these categories amounts to 17.5 percent of GDP in 
the EU compared to 12.4 percent in the United States. Here Switzerland 
sides with the EU, its share being 16 percent. 
Table 2 presents the breakdown of social expenditure (which notably 
includes old-age benefits). First, the United States is far below the EU 
average with 15 and 24 percent of GDP, respectively. Switzerland even 
exceeds the EU average with 26 percent, coming close to full-fledged 
welfare states such as Germany (27 percent) and France (29 percent). The 
main reason are old-age benefits, where U.S. public expenditure makes up 
a low 5 percent of GDP, compared to the EU share of 9 and the Swiss share 
of 12, respectively. In relative terms, the differences in family benefits are 
even more pronounced. Here, the United States spends one-fifth of the EU 
value (0.4 compared to 2.2 percent of GDP in the EU-15), with Switzerland 
once more falling in between (1.2 percent). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that countries such as France, Germany, or Sweden are 
pro-poor because social security systems typically redistribute from the 
young to the old. 
 
2.2. Government revenue 
Government expenditure of a country may be pro-poor; yet if it is 
financed in a highly regressive manner, the net effect of government 
activity may turn pro-rich. Table 3 summarizes the composition of 
government revenue in the EU, the United States, and Switzerland.  
 
Table 2. Public social expenditure in percent of GDP, 2001 
country total old-age family unemployment health incapacity other 
US 14.7 5.3 0.4 0.5 6.2 1.1 1.2 
EU-15 23.8 8.8 2.2 2.1 6.1 2.9 1.7 
Austria 26.0 10.7 2.9 1.3 5.2 2.5 3.4 
France 28.5 10.6 2.8 2.9 7.2 2.1 2.9 
Germany 27.4 11.7 1.9 2.3 8.0 2.3 1.2 
Sweden 29.8 9.2 3.8 2.4 7.4 5.2 1.8 
UK 21.8 8.1 2.2 0.6 6.1 2.5 2.3 
Switzerland 26.4 11.8 1.2 1.0 6.4 3.8 2.2 
Source: OECD (2004) Social Expenditure database.  
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First of all, the EU governments claim a much larger share of the GDP 
(46 percent on average) than their U.S. counterpart (34 percent). The figures 
do not match precisely those of Table 1 because in 2006, governments were 
accumulating debt at a different pace. The Swiss government showed the 
best budgetary discipline among the countries sampled, its expenditure 
share in the GDP of 36 percent exceeding its revenue share of 35 percent by 
relatively little. Second, governments substitute direct taxes by social 
security contributions. In the United States, the ratio of the former to the 
latter is 14/7, while in the EU it amounts to 12/16, and in Germany, even 
11/17. With a ratio of 15/7, Switzerland definitely resembles the United 
States here. Thus, in terms of direct taxation, some EU countries might look 
like tax havens compared to the United States and Switzerland but they 
make up by charging much higher social security contributions. Whether 
this reflects a more marked pro-poor orientation depends on the relative 
progressiveness of social security and income taxation. By way of contrast, 
indirect taxation is generally regarded as regressive. The ratio of direct to 
indirect taxes is 14/7 for the United States, 12/14 for the EU, but 15/7 for 
Switzerland. On this account, both the United States and Switzerland look 
more pro-poor than the EU, with France (12/15) marking an extreme. 
However, not only does the status quo reveal important differences; 
developments during the last few decades differ, too. Table 4 tracks the 
government expenditure categories “subsidies” and “social benefits” of 
Table 1 (complemented by “current transfers”, not evidenced there) since 
1980.  
 
Table 3. Composition of general government revenue in percent of GDP, 2006 
 Country  Total 
receipts 
Tax revenue Social security 
contributions 
Property 
income 
Other 
  direct taxes indirect taxes    
  total households businesses     
 US 34.0 13.6 10.3 3.3 7.3 7.0 0.8 5.3 
EU-15 45.6 12.2 9.3 2.9 13.6 15.5 0.9 3.4 
Austria 47.8 13.1 10.7 2.4 14.0 16.0 1.2 3.5 
France 50.8 11.8 8.7 3.1 15.4 18.3 0.7 4.6 
Germany 43.8 10.6 9.2 1.4 12.1 17.3 0.6 3.2 
Sweden 57.9 20.2 16.5 3.7 17.1 13.2 2.2 5.2 
UK 41.9 17.2 13.1 4.1 12.8 8.4 0.6 2.9 
Switzerland 35.4 14.9 11.3 3.6 7.2 7.1 1.4 4.8 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook database (No 82, 
Dec. 2007).    
 
By that time, countries such as Austria, France, and Germany were full-
fledged welfare states with GDP shares above 20 percent, while the United 
States stood at 13 percent. Since then, it has caught up somewhat, reaching 
some 17 percent in 2006. While data for 1980 are not available for 
Switzerland, in 1990 its share of 15 percent was close to that of the United 
States. However, Swiss transfer payments have increased particularly fast 
since then, attaining 21 percent in 2006, not far from the EU average of 22 
percent anymore. 
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Summing up the findings so far, Switzerland resembles the EU in terms 
of its government expenditure but is more similar to the United States in 
terms of its government revenues. It used to be close to the United States 
with regard to transfers but has been approaching the EU during the last 
two decades. 
 
Table 4. Government expenditure on subsidies, social benefits and other current transfers 
in percent of GDP, 1980-2006 
country 1980 1990 2000 2006 
US 12.9 13.7 14.9 16.6 
EU-15 21.3 21.8 21.7 21.7 
Austria 25.5 26.6 27.4 26.1 
France 21.3 22.7 24.2 25.4 
Germany 21.5 21.2 24.0 23.2 
Sweden 25.9 27.8 25.9 25.7 
UK 16.3 15.1 17.0 18.4 
Switzerland n.a. 14.9 18.9 20.5 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic outlook database (No. 82, 
Dec. 2007).    
    
Table 5. Membership in charitable organizations in percent of total population, 1995-1997 
country active member inactive member not a member 
US (1995) 27.3 14.9 57.8 
Germany (1997) 7.9 13.8 78.3 
Sweden (1996) 6.7 15.8 77.5 
Switzerland (1996) 5.8 15.3 78.9 
Source: World Values Survey.    
 
2.3. Redistribution through private charity 
The preceding data suggest that EU countries and Switzerland provide 
more public welfare than the United States. However, the World Values 
Survey (Table 5) shows that Americans engage in more private provision of 
welfare through charity than EU and Swiss citizens. Roberts (1984) 
hypothesizes that public provision of welfare in part crowds out private 
charity. Potential donors, seeing government transfers on the rise, have a 
weakened motivation to give. Being altruistic, they might also be willing to 
donate through the government. However, the symmetry of substitution 
effects leads to the prediction that those who donate privately prefer to 
limit public transfers. 
 
Table 6. Charitable giving as a share of GDP, 2005 
 country percent of GDP 
 US 1.67 
France 0.14 
Germany 0.22 
Ireland 0.47 
Netherlands 0.45 
UK 0.73 
Switzerland 0.37 
Sources: Charities Aid Foundation, ZEWO Foundation.    
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Therefore, a low level of public expenditure in the United States could 
be partially explained with high private donations. Table 5 tends to support 
this view. In the United States, 27 percent of the population report to 
actively participate in a charitable organization, compared to 8 percent in 
Germany and a mere 6 percent in Switzerland. Conversely, only 58 percent 
of U.S. citizens indicate not to be involved in any charitable organization, 
whereas their European counterparts are close to the 80 percent level. Table 
6 shows that the amount of charity giving in the US is also higher than in 
EU countries and Switzerland, suggesting that public transfers cause a 
reduction in voluntary donations in Europe, as predicted by the crowding-
out literature. On this score, Switzerland definitely sides with the EU rather 
than the United States. 
 
3. Economic explanations of income redistribution 
One of the main economic explanations of income redistribution states 
that the more marked the pre-tax income inequality, the higher the demand 
and the political pressure for redistribution. This is the basic idea behind 
the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard (RRMR) model3 stating that the lower 
the income of the median voter relative to the income of the average voter, 
the higher the level of taxation and redistribution. 
    
Table 7. Gini coefficients in the U.S., EU, and Switzerland, 1960-2005 
 country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
 US 42.3 39.3 39.7 42.7 45.7 45.0 
EU-15 35.1 35.1 31.2 29.6 30.3 29.9 
Austria - 29.5 31.6 26.3 29.2 26.0 
France 49.0 39.8 36.4 28.0 28.2 28.0 
Germany 38.0 39.2 36.6 30.8 29.8 28.0 
Sweden - 29.5 19.4 21.9 27.2 23.0 
UK 25.5 25.4 25.3 33.5 34.6 35.0 
Switzerland - - 35.9 33.8 31.8 31.1 
Source: WIID database, World Institute for Development Economics Research 2006.  
 
Indeed, U.S. income inequality was high in 1960 (Gini coefficient of 42, 
see Deininger & Squire, 1996) and has been again increasing since 1970 to 
reach a Gini of 45 in 2005. In the same period, the average value of EU 
countries has fallen from 35 to 30. The most notable decrease occurred in 
France, from 49 to 28. As to Switzerland, the first measurement dates back 
to 1980. Since then, its Gini coefficient has been decreasing even faster, 
from 36 to 31 (the U.S. and EU values being 43 and 30, respectively, at the 
time). Therefore, in 1980 Switzerland lay right in between the two poles but 
has been approaching the EU fast since. In view of the marked pre-tax 
income inequality in the United States, combined with low government 
expenditure and few labor market interventions, the RRMR model finds 
very weak support by the evidence. Alesina & Giuliano (2009) point out 
that the main failure of this model rests on its simplistic assumptions, viz. 
 
3 Romer (1975); Roberts (1977); Meltzer & Richard (1981). 
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the ’one person, one vote’ rule and the median-voter outcome. Barenboim 
& Karabarbounis (2008) show empirically that the very rich have more 
weight above and beyond the ’one person, one vote’ rule in the political 
process, while the very poor do not vote at all. Neustadt & Zweifel (2009) 
conduct a discrete choice experiment in Switzerland and elicit willingness 
to pay for income redistribution. Their analysis of preference heterogeneity 
with respect to current economic well-being shows that willingness to pay 
for redistribution increases with income and education, contradicting the 
RRMR model. 
   
 
Figure 1: Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (% of GDP in 2007) and income 
mobility parameter x defined as the ratio of the income in the fourth quintile to the income 
in the third quintile. 
Notes:  ̂α=26.2112, ̂β=−2.6698, ̄R
2
=0.0036 for the whole sample (the t statistic is -0.2636, i.e. 
not significant); ̂α=36.81, ̂β=−10.838, ̄R
2
=0.0493 if Denmark excluded (the t statistic is -0.966, 
i.e. still not significant). Country labels: A=Austria, AUS=Australia, BEL=Belgium, 
CAN=Canada, CH=Switzerland, D=Germany, DK=Denmark, E=Spain, F=France, 
FIN=Finland, GRE=Greece, I=Italy, IRE=Ireland, JAP=Japan, NL=Netherlands, 
NOR=Norway, POR=Portugal, S=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States, EU-
15=simple average of old EU member countries without Luxembourg (A, BEL, D, DK, E, F, 
FIN, GRE, I, IRE, NL, POR, S, UK). Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008. 
 
However, as hypothesized by Benabou & Ok (2001), earnings mobility 
may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for 
redistribution (for empirical support using U.S. data, see Alesina & La 
Ferrara, 2005). In their study of willingness to pay for redistribution, 
Neustadt & Zweifel (2009) use five alternative mobility measures and show 
that this Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis receives partial 
empirical support, albeit for only four of five measures used. However, 
individuals with no mobility at all display the highest resistance against 
redistribution, contradicting the POUM hypothesis but underscoring the 
importance of a high status quo bias. As a partial test, Figure 1 plots public 
transfers (GDP share) against the ratio of average income in the (relatively 
wealthy) fourth and average income in the (middle class) third quintile. 
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Admittedly, this is a rather poor measure of mobility, as discussed in 
Muren & Nyberg (2005). One would prefer to take into account 
probabilities of transition from the third to the fourth quintile. However, 
the data on these transition probabilities are currently available for six 
countries only (see OECD, 1996). Still, since the quintile transition 
probabilities are shown to be quite similar among the OECD countries 
(Muren & Nyberg, 2005), a large inter-quintile income difference can serve 
as a rough indicator of income mobility. In the United States, the difference 
between the third and the fourth quintile is indeed large (1.55 or 55 percent 
more income), whereas it is around 1.3 in the EU on average. When the 
outlier Denmark (DK in Figure 1) is excluded as an outlier to a negative 
relationship, the negative slope of the regression becomes slightly more 
marked, providing weak support for the POUM hypothesis of Benabou & 
Ok (2001). However, the coefficient of determination remains low, and 
United States (US in Figure 1) as well as Canada (CAN), Australia (AUS), 
Japan (JAP), and Ireland (IRE) lie far below the regression line. 
   
 
Figure 2. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (% of GDP in 2003) and openness x, 
defined as sum of exports and imports 2007 over GDP in 2007. Notes:  ̂α=19.609, ̂β=0.0473, 
̄R
2
=0.1094, t statistic is 1.433 (not significant).  
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008. 
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Figure 3. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between the natural logarithm of transfers y (in % of GDP 
in 2003) and the natural logarithm of openness x, defined as ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports 2007 over GDP in 2007. 
Notes:  ̂α=2.4068, ̂β=0.1716, ̄R
2
=0.1716, t statistic is 1.977 (significant at the 6.4 percent level).  
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008. 
 
Some authors establish a link between openness of the economy and the 
level of income redistribution by postulating the compensation hypothesis 
(Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985; Garret, 2000; Adsera & Boix, 2002). This 
hypothesis states that small open economies compensate their losers from 
international liberalization with government interventions in the domestic 
economy, mainly with an increase in transfer payments. Higher levels of 
trade imply growing risks associated with the international business cycle 
and thereby cause higher levels of income volatility and income inequality. 
As stated in Section 1, under the veil of uncertainty, risk-averse individuals 
may be willing to support income redistribution programs, especially if 
designed to help those who suffered an unexpected loss in their assets 
(health, wealth, wisdom, i.e. skills). Emphasizing the former effect, viz. that 
open economies expose citizens to more income volatility because they are 
subject to external shocks, Rodrik (1998) relates income redistribution to the 
openness of the economy. Other authors (Adsera & Boix, 2002; 
Balcells Ventura, 2006) emphasize the latter effect, the increasing inequality 
based on the idea that openness to trade creates winners and losers within 
economies. They show that the impact of openness on income 
redistribution crucially depends on income per capita and the size of 
potential loser sectors. While trade has a positive effect on the size of the 
public sector in rich countries (those abundant in high-income factors), it 
negatively affects the level of income redistribution in poor countries. 
Figure 2 plots4 transfers as a share of GDP against an indicator of openness, 
 
4 Given that transfers are associated with inefficiencies, one could argue that transfers as a 
’type of insurance against the vagaries of openness’ should progressively increase with 
openness. However, a regression of transfers on openness and (openness)
2
 yields a negative 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
S. Akkoyunlu, I. Neustadt, & P. Zweifel, JEPE, 7(1), 2020, p.1-26. 
11 
11 
the ratio between the sum of exports and imports and GDP. Indeed, the 
United States, being a rather closed economy, has the lowest transfer 
shares. And in general, increased openness does go along with more 
transfers for ’rich’ OECD countries, thus seemingly supporting the result of 
Balcells Ventura (2006). However, with a t statistic of 1.433, this bivariate 
regression does not provide conclusive evidence of a positive relationship. 
In a next step, Figure 3 plots the natural logarithm of the share of 
transfers in GDP against the natural logarithm of the indicator of openness 
as defined above. Now the t statistic has the value of 1.977 and thus implies 
weak evidence (at the 6.36 percent significance level) of a positive elasticity 
of transfers as a share of GDP with respect to the indicator of openness. 
One might argue that openness as defined by Rodrik (1998) fails to measure 
the impact of foreign trade shocks on the welfare of a population. Shifts in 
the terms of trade, however, directly indicate changes in the gains from 
trade a country can reap and hence in welfare. During the period 1960-
2006, the U.S. terms of trade exhibited a standard deviation of 0.133 
percentage points p.a. While comparable data are lacking for the EU, 
Austria and Germany come in with 0.05 and 0.085 points, respectively5. 
Once more, Switzerland is in between with 0.106 points. Note that the high 
U.S. value would lead one to predict a high amount of redistribution, 
contrary to the empirical evidence. At best, one could argue that social 
mobility in the United States serves as a substitute for redistributive 
policies. 
On the whole, economic explanations do not seem to be very successful 
in predicting the amount of income redistribution, at least when relying on 
government expenditure and transfers as indicators. If one is willing to use 
Janus-faced Switzerland as a test case, this country is never even close to 
the regression line. Thus, it causes the balance to be tipped against 
economic explanations. 
 
4. Political explanations 
The United States, the EU, and Switzerland differ in terms of their 
political institutions. The first aspect relates to the electoral level. The 
United States has a majoritarian system where the plurality rule is applied 
in federal elections (i.e. each district delegates the representative with the 
most votes), while all EU countries (with the exception of the United 
Kingdom and France) have proportional representation. Proportional 
representation tends to produce multiparty parliaments and governments, 
while majority rule favors a strict two-party system as in the United States 
or a multiparty system dominated by two players as in the United 
Kingdom. The political science literature (Lizzeri & Persico, 2001; Milesi-
                                                                                                                                       
but insignificant term. The nonlinear relationship between political (and social) openness 
and welfare is examined by Koster (2008). The author finds weak evidence of nonlinearity 
for social openness, but no evidence for political openness. 
5 Authors’ calculations from OECD Economic Outlook Database, No. 82, Dec. 2007, World 
Bank and WMM. 
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Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson & Tabellini, 2000; Persson & Tabellini, 2003) 
predicts that proportional representation tends towards universal 
programs benefitting various groups (pensioners, workers, poor, 
minorities, etc.), while majority rule results in targeted ’pork barrel’ 
programs. Persson & Tabellini (2000); Persson & Tabellini (2003) find 
supporting empirical evidence in that countries with proportional 
representation have GDP share of government expenditure that ceteris 
paribus is 5 percentage points higher than with majority rule. 
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of electoral rules on fiscal policy, plotting 
transfers as a share of GDP against a measure of proportional 
representation for most OECD countries. There is indeed weak evidence of 
a positive correlation. While the EU-15 is close to the regression line, the 
United States constitute an outlier. This is true of Switzerland too, in spite 
of its system of proportional representation and a system with several 
strong parties that is similar to continental EU countries. The reasons for 
this divergence are discussed below. 
   
 
Figure 4. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and the degree 
of proportional representation x 
Notes:  ̂α=20.058, ̂β=4.16, ̄R
2
=0.1663, t statistic is 1.91 (significant at the 7.22 percent level). 
Degree of proportional representation is the natural logarithm of the size of electoral 
districts, defined as the number of electoral districts in a country divided by the number of 
seats in the lower or single house for the most recent legislature.  
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008, Persson & Tabellini (2003). 
 
The second aspect of political institutions relates to the government. The 
United States has a presidential system while all EU countries are 
parliamentary democracies (with the exception of France, whose 
government is controlled by the majority in the parliament, however). 
Presidential regimes at first sight result in a concentration of power; 
however, they tend to have a stronger separation of powers designed to 
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prevent abuse (cf. Persson et al., 1997). Since this abuse goes along with 
increased government expenditure and transfers to supporting clientele 
groups, presidential systems are predicted to induce less income 
redistribution. 
The third aspect is the party system. Barriers to entry for parties are 
particularly high in the United States, likely due to the country’s vast size 
and low population density, both of which help to diffuse social conflict. 
This has resulted in the absence of a strong socialist party, whereas the 
European left was able to organize and divulge its ideas, resulting in a 
higher amount of income redistribution. 
The fourth aspect of political institutions of relevance for redistribution 
is fiscal decentralization. This creates obstacles to an excessive role for the 
central government in fiscal matters, making it more difficult to tax the rich 
in some part of the country in favor of the poor localized in other parts. 
Again, the United States is characterized by a higher degree of fiscal 
federalism than most EU countries (Inman & Rubinfeld, 1992), which may 
help explain its lower amount of income redistribution. 
As to Switzerland, it is on the U.S. side on items three and four 
(Supreme Court, fiscal decentralization) but on the EU side on items one 
and two (proportional representation, low barriers to entry for political 
parties). However, the distinguishing feature of Switzerland in this context 
is its direct democracy with popular initiatives and referenda. Feld et al., 
(2007) find that public expenditure tends to be better tailored to the needs 
of the electorate in direct than in representative democracies. If the 
electorate wishes to be pro-poor, Swiss redistributive policies might attain 
its objectives at a lower value of total transfers than representative 
democracies. As noted in the context of the first aspect cited (proportional 
vs. majoritarian representation), this observation is not discriminating 
because Switzerland is below the regression line in Figure 4. However, the 
Netherlands and Spain, two countries with almost no direct democratic 
control, have the same GDP share of transfers as Switzerland. Therefore, 
direct democratic control cannot alone explain why Switzerland has low 
transfers in spite of its high degree of proportional representation. 
Summing up, four aspects of political institutions seem to be relevant for 
income redistribution. One of them (degree of proportional representation) 
could be quantified; it did show the predicted relationship with the transfer 
share in GDP. Using again Switzerland for corroborating evidence, the 
country shares institutional features both with the United States and the 
EU. However, it is unique in its degree of direct democratic control, yet has 
the same GDP share of transfers as the Netherlands and Spain, two 
countries with quite different political institutions. Therefore, political 
explanations appear only slightly more convincing than the economic ones. 
 
5. Behavioral explanations 
Behavioral explanations of income redistribution importantly revolve 
around the concept of imperfect altruism. While prefect altruism is 
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exclusively governed by recipients’ preferences, imperfect altruism also 
reflects donor preferences. In particular, it predicts that people will oppose 
public welfare if they believe that recipients take advantage of the system, a 
behavior that is often attributed to members of ethnic minorities. Alesina 
et al. (1999), Alesina et al. (2001), Luttmer (2001), Alesina & Glaeser (2004), 
and Luttmer & Singhal (2008) find that people oppose redistribution 
favoring ethnic or racial groups other than their own as well as minorities 
that are overrepresented among the poor. 
   
 
Figure 5. Relationship y=̂α+̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and the 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation x 
Notes:  ̂α=23.87, ̂β=−9.915, ̄R
2
=0.0675, t statistic is -1.18 (not significant). The index of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation is the level of lack of ethnic and linguistic cohesion within a 
country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fragmented) and averaging five 
different indices, see Persson & Tabellini (2003).  
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008, Persson & Tabellini (2003). 
 
As a first piece of evidence, Figure 5 plots the bivariate relationship 
between public transfers and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. While most 
EU countries are quite homogeneous with respect to ethnicity and 
language, Belgium and Spain display a degree of heterogeneity that 
exceeds that of the United States (Canada is the extreme case here). There is 
a negative correlation, supporting the hypothesis. Switzerland has a high 
heterogeneity too, reflecting the strong division between the German-
speaking, French-speaking, and Italian-speaking parts of the country. 
However, this time it lies right on the regression line, providing 
corroborating evidence. 
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Figure 6. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and net 
migration rate x 
Notes: ̂α=26.047, ̂β=−1.458, ̄R
2
=0.1948, t statistic is -2.093 (significant at the 5.08 level).  
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008. 
 
A second aspect of fragmentation is migration. Immigration serves to 
increase the heterogeneity of a society. The net migration rate is defined as 
the difference between the immigration rate and the emigration rate. It 
would be preferable to consider the immigration rather than the net 
migration rate. However, data on the immigration rate are available for 
selected countries only. Still, in all OECD countries under consideration the 
rate of emigration is significantly lower than the immigration rate. 
Therefore, the net migration rate can be used as a rough approximation of 
the immigration rate. As Figure 6 shows, countries with higher net 
migration rates tend to spend smaller fractions of their GDP on transfers. 
The corresponding bivariate regression comes very close to conventional 
significance levels. The United States constitutes an outlier with especially 
low transfers, presumably due to a third aspect, racial heterogeneity (which 
is more pronounced there than in the majority of EU countries). Indeed, 
work by Kinder & Sanders (1996) reveals that racial resentment is the most 
powerful determinant of whites’ (who are overrepresented among payers) 
opinions on welfare, affirmative action, school desegregation, and the 
plight of the inner city. Switzerland lies close to the regression line. On the 
one hand, its rate of net migration and share of foreign population are very 
high, similar to those of the United States. But on the other hand, being 
foreign is not necessarily associated with (permanent) poverty, similar to 
most EU countries. 
Following Razin & Sadka (1995), the birth rate may be seen as a third 
indicator of fragmentation. A high rate of fertility calls for a great deal of 
intra-family redistribution, which squeezes out public transfers. This 
argument suggests a negative correlation; however, a positive relationship 
cannot be excluded due to reverse causality. A high birth rate could be 
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argued to trigger a great deal of transfers in the guise of family allowances. 
Moreover, many governments see family allowances as a means to increase 
the birth rate. When transfers are plotted against the birth rate, a negative 
relationship obtains (see Figure 7). The United States has a fertility rate that 
is only exceeded by Ireland, one-half higher than the EU average, which 
reflects very low rates in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Italy. 
Switzerland again lies close enough to the regression line to provide some 
support to the hypothesis. 
   
 
Figure 7. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and birth rate x 
Notes:  ̂α=31.469, ̂β=−0.834, ̄R
2
=0.1058, t statistic is -1.526 (not significant).  
Data source: OECD, CIA World Factbook 2008. 
 
A fourth behavioral element is beliefs. The hypothesis is that a society 
who believes that luck, birth, connections, and corruption determine wealth 
will choose a high degree of redistribution, financed by high taxes, see 
Alesina & Glaeser (2004) and Alesina & Angeletos (2005). By way of 
contrast, the conviction that high income and wealth are the result of work 
effort goes along with little income redistribution. Beliefs do differ sharply 
between the United States and the EU. Most Americans believe that anyone 
can get out of poverty by hard work and that the poor remain poor only 
because they refuse to make the effort. By way of contrast, Europeans 
generally think that poverty is due to bad luck and not the individual’s 
responsibility. Fong & Oberholzer-Gee (2007) measure the willingness-to-
pay for justice in the United States using dictator games. Dictators were 
given $10 to split between themselves and recipients. The authors find that 
one third of the dictators are willing to pay one dollar out of ten for 
obtaining the information whether poverty was due to disability or 
substance abuse. Finally, Alesina & Giuliano (2009) show that a history of 
misfortune in the recent past such as unemployment and personal trauma 
makes people more risk-averse and less optimistic about upward mobility. 
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These changes in beliefs are found to have a positive and significant effect 
on redistribution. 
   
 
Figure 8. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and the belief x 
that luck determines success (median value for each country, measured as an index from 1 
to 10, with 10 indicating strongest belief). 
Notes:  ̂α=6.319, ̂β=3.495, ̄R
2
=0.3006, t statistic is 2.778 (significant). 
Data Source: OECD, World Values Survey. 
 
Figure 8 plots transfers against a score that ranges from 1 (hard work 
always brings a better life) to 10 (hard work does not bring any success). 
The Unites States is the observation closest to the score of 1 but still lies 
below the regression line. Germany (D) and Denmark (DK) mark the other 
extreme. With a coefficient of determination of 0.3 and a t statistic of 2.778, 
this is one of two best-fitting bivariate regressions designed to explain the 
share of transfers in GDP. Here again, Switzerland lies right near the 
regression line, lending additional support to the hypothesis. 
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Figure 9. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and political 
orientation x (median value for country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 
indicating the right-wing orientation). 
Notes: ̂α=41.099, ̂β=3.444, ̄R
2
=0.0506, t statistic is -1.063 (not significant). 
Data Source: OECD, World Values Survey. 
 
A fifth behavioral element is political attitudes. For a long time, political 
scientists have been relating left-wing orientation to attitudes in favor of 
income redistribution (Downs, 1957)6. However, the relationship between 
the political orientation of the median voter and the actual amount of 
redistribution (measured by the share of GDP devoted to transfers, as 
before) turns out amazingly weak. In Figure 9, political attitudes of the 
median voters range on a scale between 1 (left-wing) and 10 (right-wing). 
Note that there is little variation, with the EU-15 at 5.3 and the United 
States at 5.8. Switzerland lies close enough to the regression line to provide 
supporting evidence, which however is weak to begin with in view of the 
very low coefficient of determination. 
   
 
6 Frohlich & Boschmann (1986) provide supporting empirical evidence for the United States 
and Canada. 
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Figure 10. Relationship y=̂α+ ̂βx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and religiosity 
x (median value for country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the 
highest importance of God in life). 
Notes: ̂α=33.695, ̂β=−1.877, ̄R
2
=0.3175, t statistic is -2.906 (significant at the 1 percent level). 
Data Source: OECD, World Values Survey. 
 
As a sixth and final behavioral dimension, one can cite religiosity. There 
are three strands of theory, all of them predicting a negative relationship 
between religiosity and income redistribution. First, Benabou & Tirole 
(2006) model collective cultural beliefs, one of which is religion. In their 
’highly religious’ (Protestant) equilibrium, hard work and industriousness 
are believed to have rewards in the afterlife, the amount of redistribution is 
low, and average effort and output are high. In their ’less religious’ 
equilibrium, there is less effort and more redistribution (e.g. through alms). 
Second, Scheve & Stasavage (2006a); Scheve & Stasavage (2006b) argue and 
provide evidence that religion provides insurance against adverse events. 
Therefore risk-averse religious individuals express less demand for 
redistribution as a collective insurance devise, resulting again in a negative 
predicted relationship between religiosity and redistribution. A third 
strand argues that public welfare crowds out participation in church and 
charitable activities, giving once more rise to a negative correlation. 
Hungerman (2005) and Gruber & Hungerman (2007) find evidence that 
public insurance spending indeed crowds out religious charitable 
spending. Figure 10 shows the strength of religious orientation (1 = no 
importance of God in life, 10 = maximum importance) to vary considerably, 
with the United States marking the high end. With a coefficient of 
determination of 0.32 and a t statistic of -2.906, this is the best-fitting 
bivariate regression designed to explain the share of transfers in the GDP. 
Hence, the partial correlation between religiosity and the share of transfers 
in GDP is clearly negative, supporting the theories expounded above. On 
this score, Switzerland shares the somewhat guarded attitudes prevailing 
in the EU. Being located close to the regression line, it provides additional 
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evidence supporting the theoretical arguments relating religion to 
redistribution. 
 
6. Final assessment 
In sum, out of six behavioral factors that according to the existing 
literature influence attitudes with regard to income redistribution, all (with 
the exception of ethno-linguistic fragmentation) were found to be at least 
partially correlated with the amount of income distribution as measured by 
public transfers as a share of GDP. And in all cases, Switzerland, located 
between the United States and the EU, is on or close to the regression line, 
in contradistinction to the economic and political explanations considered. 
This observation is informative: Switzerland consistently lies between the 
United States and the EU average on all six scales used as explanatory 
variables. If the estimated relationships have validity, it should therefore be 
located on or close to the regression line rather than constituting an outlier. 
Since this prediction is confirmed, it tips the balance in favor of behavioral 
explanations of income redistribution. 
A final assessment can be based on multivariate analysis relating the 
share of transfers in GDP to mobility, openness (both economic), 
proportional representation (political), ethno-linguistic fragmentation, 
migration rate, birth rate, belief that luck determines success, political 
orientation, and religiosity (all behavioral). Applying the general-to-specific 
approach (a stepwise reduction procedure by excluding the least significant 
regressor), one arrives at the final model of Table 8. The two explanatory 
variables retained are both behavioral, viz. the belief that luck determines 
success and religiosity. Moreover, their coefficients do not significantly 
differ from the coefficients in the respective bivariate regressions. They are 
both significant at the 5 percent significance level in the final model as 
shown in Table 8 (compared to a 1 percent significance level in the bivariate 
regressions, cf. Figures 8 and 10). However, these two variables are jointly 
significant at the 1 percent level, as indicated by the test statistic 
F(2,17)=7.19 (p-value of 0.0055). 
    
Table 8. Final model for the share of public transfers in GDP 
 coefficient standard error t-value significance 
 constant 19.290 7.925 2.434 5% 
belief in luck 2.537 1.215 2.089 10% 
religiosity -1.457 0.654 -2.229 5% 
Note: Joint significance test: F(2,17)=7.19:[0.0055]  
 
Neustadt (2011) elicits preferences for income redistribution through a 
Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland and relates 
them to several behavioural determinants, in particular to religious beliefs 
and degree of religiosity. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is 
positive among those who do not belong to a religious denomination, and 
negative otherwise. However, the marginal WTP is shown to increase with 
a higher degree of religiosity. Moreover, those who state that luck or 
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connections play a crucial role in determining economic success exhibit 
significantly higher WTP values than those who deem effort to be decisive. 
These results provide corroborating evidence for the outcome of the 
estimated model in 8. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, an attempt was made to explain the difference in the 
amount of public income redistribution between the United States and the 
European Union (EU), based on an empirical examination of three sets of 
determinants, economic, political, and behavioral, with the most recent 
data for 20 developed OECD countries7 listed in Figure 1. The previous 
literature (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004) looks at bivariate relations between the 
amount of public redistribution and various economic, political, and 
behavioral variables for large data sets including developing countries. In 
addition to the variables in Alesina & Glaeser (2004), we included further 
variables in our study such as a measure for social mobility, migration rate 
and birth rate. Since Switzerland, a non-EU country, is almost always 
located between the two polar cases, we use it as a test case providing 
corroborating or contradicting evidence. 
Economic determinants predict more rather then less income 
redistribution in the United States than in EU, contrary to facts. Before-tax 
income inequality is higher, the income distribution is more skewed, and 
incomes and terms of trade are more volatile in the United States than in 
the EU countries. However, U.S. income mobility is higher, too, possibly 
serving as a substitute for redistribution. Pertinent bivariate regressions 
have poor statistical fit. Moreover, Switzerland lies rather far from the 
respective regression lines, providing contradicting rather than 
corroborating evidence. 
Political variables include district rather than proportional 
representation, a two-party vs. multiparty system, a presidential vs. 
parliamentary democracy, courts emphasizing property rights, and failure 
of a strong and lasting socialist party to form; all distinguishing the United 
States from the EU. However, once again, the bivariate regressions do not 
have much explanatory power. And again, Switzerland comes close to 
being an outlier, thus failing to buttress the weak supporting evidence. 
Behavioral explanations include ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the 
country, the migration rate, the birth rate, the belief that luck determines 
success, the degree of left-wing orientation, and the strength of religious 
belief. On several of these scores, the U.S. population constitutes an outlier. 
In particular, it sees hard work rather than luck as a determinant of success, 
contrary to the population of a typical EU country. Two bivariate 
regressions (with belief that the luck determines economic success and 
religion as the explanatory variable, respectively) attain coefficients of 
 
7 However, the regression on the belief about luck vs. effort as well as the final multivariate 
regression do not include Greece due to a lack of data. 
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determination of 0.3 or more. In addition, the Swiss observation is on or 
close to the regression line, thus providing supporting evidence. In a final 
assessment, we identify the most significant variables based on a 
multivariate regression, complementing the bivariate analyses by Alesina & 
Glaeser (2004). 
Both the bivariate and the multivariate regressions suggest the following 
conclusions. The United States has less income redistribution than the 
European Union for three main reasons. The first is political. With its 
absence of proportional representation (a feature shared with Australia, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom, countries with a low amount of 
redistribution, too), the United States has an impediment against resolving 
political conflict through buying off minorities, a tradition characterizing 
notably Austria and Sweden (see Figure 4 again). Using Switzerland as a 
test case, its observation is off the regression line by about the same amount 
as the United States (and on the same side). Therefore, it does contribute a 
measure of confirmatory evidence. The other two reasons are behavioral. 
The U.S. population does not believe that chance determines economic 
success, contrary to the EU population (see Figure 8 again). Further, it 
believes that God is of critical importance in life, which is held to a 
comparable degree by the Portuguese but certainly not by the EU 
population on average (see Figure 10 again). On both scores, the Swiss 
observation is on or close to the respective regression line, providing a bit 
of supporting evidence. And on both scores, Switzerland is located 
between the United States and the EU, showing its Janus face. 
It is appropriate to point out the limitations of this analysis. First, it does 
not rest on a unifying theoretical basis, drawing on economics, political 
science, and sociology in an eclectic manner. Second, possible determinants 
are tested mainly one by one in a series of bivariate regressions. This of 
course entails the risk of attributing influence to a factor that should be 
attributed to another factor not controlled for. Third, the evidence relates to 
a point in time. Measured values can be subject to transitory shocks causing 
them to differ from the permanent values the theories refer to. Fourth, one 
could argue that while accepting the view that the United States and the 
European Union constitute two polar cases with regard to income 
redistribution, some country other than Switzerland should have been 
selected as a test case in between. All these limitations have to be taken 
serious. Above all, they call for additional research to answer the question, 
“Why is there such a marked difference between the United States and the 
European Union in terms of income redistribution?” The present study 
may provide a few preliminary answers that need to be corroborated. It 
uses Switzerland as a test case because that country, while being in the 
middle of Europe, does have a few features that are reminiscent of the 
United States, giving it an intriguing Janus face. 
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